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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal of, among other orders and judgments, a
final summary judgment entered against Leland A. Martineau
personally for a debt secured by a mortgage on real property
prior to the sale of the property.

The order was entered by the

Honorable Scott Daniels in the Third Judicial District Court in
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

The Utah Supreme Court

had original jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1989) because the Court of Appeals
does not have original appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (Supp. 1989).

This court currently has

jurisdiction pursuant to a transfer of this case by the Supreme
Court of Utah to this Court dated July 27, 1989, pursuant to the
Utah Supreme Court's authority to do so under Utah Code Ann. §
78-2-2(4) and Rule 4A of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This case was initially an action for a debt on an oral
contract.

The defendant Leland Martineau counterclaimed for

amounts due him from plaintiffs.

Thereafter, plaintiffs produced

a mortgage securing the debt, and the parties entered a
stipulation as to the amount of the debt and requiring plaintiffs
to foreclose on the property prior to seeking a deficiency
judgment.

A third party assignee brought a foreclosure action in

Idaho; and when defenses were raised in that action, the

plaintiffs came back before the Utah court to seek to be allowed
to proceed against Martineau personally without being required to
foreclose the property.
plaintiffs to do so.

The court amended the judgment to allow

Later, when the case was in a posture to go

to trial on defendant's offsets and counterclaims, the plaintiffs
made a motion for summary judgment dismissing the entire action
because defendant Martineau had assigned his claims to a
partnership of which he was a general partner.

Without allowing

the substitution or joinder of the partnership as a party, the
court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the
remaining issues in the case.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Did the trial court err in denying the defendant's

motion to set aside the Order and Judgment entered on October 1,
1985, based on the fact that the plaintiffs, Michael Strand and
MLK Investments, had assigned their causes of action to Nupetco
Associates prior to the commencement of the action and were not
the real parties in interest?
2.

Did the trial court err in treating the October 1, 1985,

order as a personal judgment against Leland Martineau for a sum
certain and in amending the order to allow plaintiffs1 assignee
to proceed against the personal assets of defendant Leland A.
Martineau prior to sale of the mortgaged property and the
determination of a deficiency?

2

3.

Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment

precluding defendant Leland Martineau from asserting the offsets,
defenses and claims specifically reserved in the October 1985
order, in light of the fact that the court had previously allowed
the named plaintiffs to continue the action despite not being the
real party in interest and without granting the defendant the
opportunity to obtain written approval from the Hammons-Martineau
Partnership to assert the offsets and claims in this action or to
join the Partnership as a defendant?
4.

Did the trial court err in substituting Nupetco

Associates as the plaintiff on its own motion and over
defendants' objections?
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
1.

Rule 17(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Parties plaintiff and defendant.
(a) Real party in interest. Every action
shall be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest. . . . No action shall be
dismissed on the ground that it is not
prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest until a reasonable time has been
allowed after objection for ratification of
commencement of the action by, or joinder or
substitution of the real party in interest.

2.

Rule 25(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(c) Transfer of Interest. In the case of
any transfer of interest, the action may be
continued by or against the original party,
unless the court upon motion directs the
person to whom the interest is transferred to
be substituted in the action or joined with
the original party. Service of the motion
shall be made as provided in Subdivision (a)
of this Rule.
3

3.

Rule 60(b)(7), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Relief from judgment or order.

(b) On motion and upon such terms as are
just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order
or proceeding for . . . (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment.
4.

Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-22.

Nature of a partner's right in

specific partnership property.
(1) A partner is co-owner with his partners
of specific partnership property holding as a
tenant in partnership.
(2) The incidence of this tenancy are such
that:
(a) A partner, subject to the
provisions of this Chapter and to any
agreement between the partners, has an equal
right with his partners to possess specific
partnership property for partnership
purposes; but he has no right to possess such
property for any other purposes without the
consent of his partners.
5.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1.

Form of Action -- Judgment—

Special Execution.
There can be one action for the recovery of
any debt or the enforcement of any right
secured solely by mortgage upon real estate
which action must be in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter. Judgment shall
be given adjudging the amount due, with costs
and disbursements, and the sale of mortgaged
property, or some part, thereof, to satisfy
said amount and accruing costs, and directing
the sheriff to proceed and sell the same
according to the provisions of law relating

4

to
sales
on
execution, and
a
special
execution or order of sale shall be issued
for that purpose.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-2.

Deficiency Judgment—Execution.

If it appears from the return of the officer
making the sale that the proceeds are
insufficient and a balance still remains due,
judgment therefor must then be docketed by
the clerk and execution may be issued for
such balance as in other cases; but no
general execution shall issue until after the
sale of the mortgaged property and the
application
of
the
amount
realized
as
aforesaid.
Idaho Code, § 6-101.
6-101. Proceedings in foreclosure—Effect of
foreclosure on holder of unrecorded lien.—
There can be but one action for the recovery
of any debt, or the enforcement of any right
secured by mortgage upon real estate which
action must be in accordance with the
Provisions of this chapter. In such action
the court may, by its judgment, direct a sale
of the incumbered property (or so much
thereof as may be necessary) and the
application of the proceeds of the sale to
the payment of the costs of the court and the
expenses of the sale, and the amount due to
the plaintiff; and sales of real estate under
judgments of foreclosure of mortgages and
liens are subject to redemption as in the
case of sales under execution; (and if it
appear from the sheriff's return that the
proceeds are insufficient, and a balance
still remains due, judgment can then be
docketed for such balance against the
defendant or defendants personally liable for
the debt), and it becomes a lien on the real
estate of such judgment debtor, as in other
cases on which execution may be issued.
No person holding a conveyance from or under
the mortgagor of the property mortgaged, or
having a lien thereon, which conveyance or

5

lien does not appear of record in the proper
office at the commencement of the action,
need be made a party to such action; and the
judgment therein rendered, and th€>
proceedings therein had, are as conclusive
against the party holding such unrecorded
conveyance or lien as if he had been made a
party to the action.
8.

Idaho Code § 6-108.
6-108. Deficiency judgments—Amount
restricted.—
No court in the state of
Idaho shall have jurisdiction to enter a
deficiency judgment in any case involving a
foreclosure of a mortgage on real property in
any amount greater than the difference
between the mortgage indebtedness, as
determined by the decree, plus costs of
foreclosure and sale, and the reasonable
value of the mortgaged property, to be
determined by the court in the decree upon
the taking of evidence of such value.
STATEMENT OF CASE
The original complaint in this matter was filed on August 2,

1983, by the plaintiffs Michael W. Strand and MLK Investments
(hereinafter "Strand" and "MLK" or "plaintiffs") against
defendant Leland A. Martineau (hereinafter "Martineau"), Charles
Waters, Magic Valley Motors, Inc., and Magic Valley Properties,
seeking judgment in the amount of $427,989.25 plus interest
allegedly loaned defendants by plaintiffs.

(R. 2)

The only

defendant served with the summons and complaint was Leland A.
Martineau, and he counterclaimed for amounts owing him from
plaintiffs for auditing and financial services rendered.

(R. 5)

The matter went to trial on September 3, 19 85; and although
plaintiffs did not plead that the loan was secured by a mortgage,
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plaintiffs did introduce a mortgage signed by Leland A. Martineau
and Charles Waters for Magic Valley Properties in their capacity
as general partners.

This mortgage purportedly secured real

property located in Cassia County, Idaho, owned by Magic Valley
Properties.

(R. 205)

This mortgage was not supported by a

promissory note or any other documentation independently
evidencing the debt.

(R. 205)

After the noon recess on

September 3rd, the defendant argued a motion to dismiss based on
the fact that the plaintiffs had not sought to foreclose the
mortgage prior to seeking judgment against Leland A. Martineau as
required by the one action rule embodied in Utah Code Ann. §§
78-37-1 and 2 (1987).

(R. 158-59).

During the course of that argument, the parties reached a
stipulation that there was a loan in the amount of $327,989.25 to
Magic Valley Properties which was secured by a mortgage on the
real property in Idaho, despite the absence of an underlying
promissory note.

The parties further agreed that plaintiffs were

required to first foreclose the property and exhaust their
security prior to seeking a deficiency judgment against Leland
Martineau.

(R. 165-69)

The other terms of the stipulation are

less than clear, and the record itself is contradictory.
Minute Entry of September 3, 1985, the court orders the
following:
1) this case is hereby dismissed without
prejudice;

7

In the

2) the parties may proceed in the Idaho
Courts [sic];
3)

no fees are allowed as to this case.

(R. 41) .
The subsequent Order and Judgment entered on the stipulation
on October 11, 1985 f includes terms not contained in the Minute
Entry or transcript.

By its terms, the parties agreed to reserve

the issue of whether the remaining $100,000 in dispute was a loan
or an investment by the plaintiffs, (R. 167) and the parties
agreed to reserve all other issues and defenses except as to the
validity of the mortgage, including but not limited to Leland A.
Martineau ! s counterclaims and offsets.

The order also included

language that plaintiffs were required to foreclose the mortgage
"before proceeding against the personal assets of the defendant
Martineau."

(R. 51)

A copy of this Order is included in the

Addendum to this brief as Exhibit "A" and by reference made a
part hereof.
Thereafter, on December 3, 1985, Nupetco Associates,
plaintiffs 1 assignee and an entity which was not a party to this
action, filed to foreclose the real property secured by the
mortgage in Cassia County, Idaho.

(R. 67)

It was only at that

time that defendant Leland Martineau learned that Mike Strand and
MLK had assigned their interest in the mortgage at issue in this
action to Nupetco on April 27, 1983, over three months prior to
having filed the complaint.

(R. 60 and 271)
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Upon learning this,

Leland Martineau filed for relief from the Order and Judgment
pursuant to Rules 60 and 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
on the basis that Strand and MLK were not the real parties in
interest.

Defendant argued that, as a result, he was denied

remedies and defenses which would have been available to him
against Nupetco as a third-party assignee.

He also argued that

the knowledge was essential for him to determine how to defend
the suit and assert his counterclaims.

(R. 58 - 63)

In

addition, the terms he had stipulated to on September 3rd were
based on his understanding that Strand and MLK were the real
parties in interest.
Although not made a party to this suit, Nupetco filed a
memorandum in reply to this Rule 6 0 motion which asserted the
defense of collateral estoppel, waiver based on Martineaufs
alleged prior knowledge of the assignment and denial that
plaintiffs were not the real parties in interest.

(R. 83 - 90) .

Plaintiffs Strand and MLK also filed a memorandum in reply (R.
108 - 113) alleging Martineau did have actual and/or constructive
notice of the assignment, and that even if he did not, the
assignment was irrelevant.

In the memorandum, the plaintiffs

argued that, "If Nupetco is a successor in interest to Strand,
any defenses Martineau had against Strand, would also lie against
Nupetco."

(R. Ill)

The defendant filed a reply memorandum

challenging the validity of the assignment on the basis that the

9

judgment was not a final judgment capable of being assigned and
responding to the other arguments made in opposition.

(R. 273 -

279) .
After taking the matter under advisement (R. 117), Judge
Daniels summarily denied the defendant's motion for relief from
the Order and Judgment.

(R. 118)

A copy of the Order is

included in the Addendum to this brief as Exhibit "B" and by
reference made a part hereof.

On November 24, 1986, even though

Nupetco had still not been made a party to the action, Ralph
Petty filed an appearance of counsel on its behalf.

(R. 125)

On December 9, 1986, defendant Leland Martineau filed a
Notice of Appeal from the October 11, 1985, Order and Judgment
and the court's denial of defendant's motion for relief from this
order.

(R. 128)

While this appeal was later dismissed

supposedly on stipulation of the parties (R. 302), that document
was only a small part of a larger stipulation which would have
expedited resolution of the issues in several cases pending
between the parties.
Pursuant to its terms, the parties would have agreed to:
(1) dismiss the appeal;

(2) consolidate this case with the case

of Strand v. Martineau, also filed in the Third Judical District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, Civil No. C81-5600; and (3)
agree to lift the automatic stay imposed by the bankruptcy court
in the bankruptcy of Magic Valley Properties so that plaintiffs
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could proceed to foreclose the Cassia County property.

(R. 319)

Although two sets of documents outlining the entire agreement
were sent to John Caine and a set was sent to Ralph Petty, they
each refused to execute all of the documents.

Instead, they

executed the stipulation to dismiss the appeal and filed it.

(R.

318 - 321)
Although the entire stipulation would have allowed the
plaintiffs to proceed to foreclose the property, on November 4,
1987, the attorney for Nupetco, Ralph Petty, filed a motion to
amend the judgment on behalf of plaintiffs Strand and MLK.
304)

(R.

The motion sought to amend the Order and Judgment of

October 11, 1985, to remove the requirement that plaintiff
foreclose on the real property before proceeding against the
personal assets of Leland Martineau.

The motion alleged that the

plaintiffs were entitled to such an amendment because the
defendants in the Idaho foreclosure suit had asserted defenses
against Nupetco which plaintiffs asserted Lee Martineau had
agreed to waive as against Michael Strand and MLK in this matter.
In essence, they argued that Nupetco should not be required to
exhaust the security before proceeding against Martineau1s
personal assets to punish Martineau for defenses raised by Magic
Valley Properties against Nupetco.

(R. 305 - 313)

The motion

was summarily granted by Judge Daniels in a Minute Entry dated
November 20, 1987.

(R. 338)

A copy of the Order on this ruling

11

is included in the Addendum to this brief as Exhibit "C" and by
reference made a part hereof.
The defendant Martineau made a motion for rehearing on the
basis that:
1.

The original stipulation and subsequent Order and

Judgment does not grant a money judgment against Lee Martineau
personally;
2.

That such a result had not been intended by the parties

at the time they entered stipulation;
3.

That a judgment prior to sale of security is contrary to

the one action rule outlined in Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-37-1 and 2;
and
4.

That the defenses at issue raised in Idaho were by Magic

Valley Properties and Magic Valley Motors, entities not parties
to this suit, against Nupetco, an entity not yet a party either.
(R. 345 - 348 and R. 375 - 379)
At approximately the same time, defendant Martineau also
made a motion to consolidate a second suit brought by Strand
against Martineau seeking damages for alleged professional
malpractice.

It was Lee Martineaufs position that there were

similar parties and issues arising from the same factual
scenarios and that consolidation would be judicially prudent as
it would resolve all legal disputes between the parties.
343)

Although plaintiffs had originally agreed to such a
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(R.

consolidation, (R. 319) they later changed their minds and filed
objections to defendant's motion.

(R. 383 - 386)

On December 4, 1987, Judge Daniels denied Martineau's
motions to consolidate and the motion for rehearing.

He set

trial for January 19 and 20, 1988, and ordered Martineau to
submit an affidavit outlining the offsets and claims he would be
asserting at trial in order to support Martineaufs motion to stay
execution pending trial.

(R. 391)

Within 10 days, Martineau

submitted this affidavit (R. 420) which outlined the offsets
claimed and categorized them as follows:
1.

Amounts owing from plaintiffs and their related entities

for accounting services rendered them by defendant Martineau.
2.

For reimbursement of one-half of monies expended and

services performed by Martineau on behalf of Magic Valley
Properties based on defendant Martineau's position that Strand
was a partner of that entity, a claim which Mr. Strand denies.
3.

Amounts owing Martineau from Strand pursuant to a

judgment entered against Strand in the case of Strand v. Hammons,
Civil No. C82-8686, entered in the Third Judicial District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah (hereinafter, the
"Hammons judgment").

The judgment is held by the

Hammons-Martineau Partnership of which Martineau is a partner.
(R. 420 - 422).
After reviewing the affidavits, Mr. Petty filed, once again

13

on behalf of the plaintiffs Strand and MLK, a motion to lift the
stay of execution entered by Judge Daniels pending trial.

The

motion was based on a challenge to the offsets in dispute as
follows:
1.

That Martineau could not assert claims against Strand

for accounting services performed on behalf of Magic Valley
Properties because that entity was in bankruptcy and such a claim
was a violation of the automatic stay in the bankruptcy court.
(R. 432)
2.

That Martineau could not personally utilize the judgment

against Strand as a matter of law because the judgment is a
partnership asset (R. 435) and because it did not exist when the
action was filed.
The motion was summarily denied in a Minute Entry dated
December 22, 1987.

(R. 444)

The remaining issues came up for trial on January 19, 1988,
before the Honorable Judge Moffat as a result of a calendar
switch between him and Judge Daniels.

(R. 44 8)

In a pretrial

conference in the Judge's chambers, Mr. Caine and Mr. Petty
asserted that Martineau no longer had the right to assert any
offsets as he had assigned all of his claims to the HammonsMartineau Partnership, and a partner cannot personally use
partnership property.

Judge Moffat continued the trial and

ordered counsel to brief the issue.

14

In defense of plaintiff's position on this matter, (See
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintifffs
Motion for Summary Judgment at R. 453 - 506) defendant argued as
follows (R. 507 -520):
1.

Pursuant to the express provisions of Rule 17(a) of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs1 objection that
Martineau was no longer the real party in interest is not grounds
for dismissal of his counterclaims;
2.

The court had previously denied Martineau's motion for

relief from judgment based on the fact that plaintiffs had not
been the real party in interest when plaintiff filed its
complaint, and therefore it would now be inequitable and improper
to grant plaintiffs' motion and deny Martineau his right to
assert offsets on the very same basis•

At the very least,

Martineau should be given opportunity to join the partnership or
obtain ratification from that entity to proceed.

He had

previously been specifically precluded from doing so by Judge
Moffat (See p. 21 of the transcript beginning at R. 698);
3.

At all times, Strand, MLK and Nupetco recognized any

judgment was subject to Martineau's offsets and each had notice
of the offsets since at least 1983;
4.

The partnership agreement itself authorized Martineau to

assert the offsets;
5.

Plaintiffs had mischaracterized the nature of the

offsets; and

15

6.

Rule 13(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows

use of a claim which matures after the instigation of a suit.
After hearing on these issues on April 22, 1988, (See the
transcript beginning R. 698) Judge Daniels took the matter under
advisement. (R. 560)

On August 23, 1988, Judge Daniels issued a

decision that "The law appears to be that one who assigns his
offsets cannot assert them as a counterclaim.
summary judgment is granted."

The motion for

(R. 561)

After numerous objections to a multitude of proposed orders
and after denial of plaintiff's motion for relief from the
judgment on the basis that the decision was contrary to law (R.
564), an order was entered by the court on November 10, 1988.
(R. 605)

This order was subsequently set aside for the

plaintiff's failure to comply with Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration and give defendant's counsel notice of
the order and opportunity to object.

(R. 606)

The final order

was entered on April 26, 1989, (R. 665 - 666) wherein the court
granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and dismissed all
claims of Lee Martineau against Nupetco, Strand and MLK.

A copy

of this Order is included in the Addendum to this brief as
Exhibit "D" and by reference made a part hereof.
Finally, in a hearing on October 21, 1988, on a completely
different set of motions, the issue as to whether the pleadings
should be amended and Nupetco be formally joined as a party
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happened to be raised by the Court.
beginning at R. 696)

(See pg. 5 of the transcript

Mr. Caine, attorney for Strand and MLK,

argued that Nupetco had been the plaintiff all along.
beginning 696 at pg. 5)

Over defendant's objections, the court

granted a motion to amend the pleadings.
p. 9)

(Tr.

(Tr. beginning 696 at

The initial order substituting parties was signed on

November 10, 1988.

It was, however, set aside on April 10, 1989,

due once again to plaintiffs' failure to comply with Rule 4-504
and give the defendant notice of the order and opportunity to
object.

(R. 600)

(R. 663)

A second order was entered on April 26, 1989.

A copy of this Order is included in the Addendum as

Exhibit "E" and by reference made a part hereof.
Subsequently, defendant Martineau filed his notice of
appeal. (R. 667)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The complaint was filed by plaintiffs Strand and MLK in

an action on an alleged oral contract for a loan.

At trial, the

defendant Martineau argued that the case should be dismissed
because the plaintiffs had produced a mortgage allegedly securing
the debt, and pursuant to the one action rule, they should be
precluded from seeking a judgment prior to foreclosing the
property.

During those arguments, the parties reached a

stipulation, and an order was entered.

Thereafter, defendant

Martineau learned that the plaintiffs had assigned the mortgage
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to Nupetco Associates three months prior to their filing a
complaint.

He made a motion for relief from the judgment, and it

was denied by the court.

It was error to deny the motion as the

assignment and defendant Martineaufs lack of knowledge thereof
precluded him from asserting defenses against the real party in
interest, and it prejudiced him in his negotiation of and his
agreement to the stipulation.
2.

After plaintiffs' assignor, Nupetco Associates, had

difficulty foreclosing the property in Idaho, the plaintiffs
Strand and MLK sought a personal judgment against Martineau for
the entire amount of the debt to which the parties had
stipulated.

The court granted the motion on the basis that

defendant Martineau had been in contempt of the stipulation, and
the Order and Judgment was amended to allow the plaintiff to
proceed against the personal assets of defendant Martineau.

This

is contrary to the law as the one action rule embodied in Utah
Code Ann. §§ 78-37-1 and 2 requires a party to foreclose property
prior to seeking a deficiency judgment, and there is no authority
to allow a party to circumvent that requirement in a situation
where one party is allegedly in contempt.
In addition, there were factual issues as to whether
Martineau was actually breaching the stipulation and whether the
plaintiffs were not also doing so.

Finally, at no time did the

defendant stipulate that judgment be entered against him, at no
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time did the court hear evidence to determine if the debt, if
any, was that of Lee Martineau, and no prior money judgment had
been entered before the court amended the Order and Judgment to
allow the plaintiffs to proceed against Martineau personally.
There being no basis in law or fact to do so, it was error to
grant plaintiffs1 motion and treat the Order of October 1985 as a
personal judgment against Leland Martineau.
3.

During the course of these proceedings, the defendant

Martineau assigned his counterclaims and offsets to the
Hammons-Martineau Partnership.

Nupetco filed a motion for

summary judgment on the basis that Martineau could no longer
assert these claims because a partner cannot use partnership
property for his own benefit.

The court granted the motion and

dismissed the defendant's claims.
The dismissal was error under Rules 17 and 25 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure without first allowing defendant time to
join or substitute the partnership as a party or obtain
ratification of his purported authority to assert the claims.

In

addition, the rule that a partner cannot personally use
partnership property is statutorily made subject to an agreement
between the parties to the contrary.

In this case, the use of

the offsets was authorized by the Hammons-Martineau Partnership
Agreement and by the partnership minutes.

Finally, the dismissal

was inequitable in light of the history of the case wherein the
court allowed the named plaintiffs to continue the action even
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though they had assigned the mortgage at issue prior to filing
the suit.

As a result, the order granting summary judgment and

dismissing the case should be vacated.
4.

Although the attorney for Nupetco filed an appearance of

counsel in November of 19 86, Nupetco was not made a party to this
case until the order entered in April of 1989.

In light of the

totality of the circumstances, it was error to allow Nupetco to
be substituted for Strand and MLK at such a late date.

Prior to

Nupetco becoming a party, the court allowed Ralph Petty and John
Caine to both continue to prosecute this action on behalf of all
three parties, and file documents in defense of defendant's
various motions.

In addition, it was error to substitute Nupetco

without also allowing the defendant to join or substitute the
Hammons-Martineau Partnership so that all unresolved issues
between the parties could be resolved in a judicially economical
fashion.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM THE ORDER AND JUDGMENT
BASED ON THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFFS1 WERE NOT
THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST. AS A RESULT,
DEFENDANT MARTINEAU WAS DENIED THE ABILITY TO
DETERMINE PROPER DEFENSES, COUNTERCLAIMS AND
WAS WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE NECESSARY TO MAKE AN
INFORMED DECISION AS TO THE STIPULATION WHICH
LED TO THE ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF OCTOBER 11,
1985.
The complaint was filed by Mike Strand and MLK Investments,
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a related entity, on July 29, 1983, seeking judgment against
defendants for monies allegedly loaned them in the amount of
$427,989,25.

(R. 2)

Defendant Magic Valley Properties was a

partnership formed to purchase and hold real property on which a
car dealership was to be operated by Magic Valley Motors, an
Idaho corporation.

It was Strand's position that the entire

amount had been loaned by him as an independent third party to
the partnership.

Defendant Martineau was the only defendant

served, and he disputed that the entire amount was a loan,
claiming instead that Strand was a partner also and had invested
monies into the partnership.

Martineau also counterclaimed for

amounts due him from Strand and MLK for accounting services
rendered these plaintiffs, their related entities, and Magic
Valley Properties.

(R. 5)

At the time he answered and

counterclaimed, the defendant had no idea that the mortgage upon
which plaintiffs relied had been previously assigned to a third
party, Nupetco Associates.

(R. 271)

Therefore, the defenses and

claims he asserted were only those available against the named
plaintiffs.
It was also without knowledge of the assignment that
defendant entered into the stipulation agreeing to the amount of
the debt which was secured by the mortgage submitted by
plaintiffs.

(R. 165 - 169)

This stipulation led to the Order

and Judgment dated October 11, 1985.
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(R. 50)

Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, "The court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a
party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or
proceeding for • . . (7) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment."
After learning of the assignment of the mortgage by
plaintiffs to Nupetco prior to their bringing suit, Martineau
brought a motion for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b) (7) because the
plaintiffs were not the real party in interest under Rule 17(a)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which requires that "Every
action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest,"

The policy behind this requirement was addressed by

the Utah Supreme Court in Shurtleff v. Jay Tuft & Co., 622 P.2d
1168 (Utah 1980).

In Shurtleff, the court stated:

A defendant has the right to have a cause of
action prosecuted by the real party in
interest to avoid further action on the same
demand by another and to permit the defendant
to assert all defenses or counterclaims
available against the real owner of the
cause.
Id. at 1172 (citing Shaw v. Jeppson, 121 Utah 155, 239 P.2d 745
(1952)).
The Utah Supreme Court has also directly addressed the issue
of whether an assignor, such as Strand and MLK herein, is a real
party in interest.

In Lynch v. MacDonald, 12 Utah 2d 427, 367

P.2d 464 (1962) the court concluded that "The general rule is
that an assignee is the real party in interest."
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Id. at 468.

Another factor to consider in determining whether a party to
an action is the real party in interest and capable of bringing
suit is whether that party owns the right to do so and has
authority to discharge the liability.

This test was outlined by

the Supreme Court of New Mexico in L, R. Property Management,
Inc. v. Grebe, 96 N.M. 22, 627 P.2d 864 (1981).

In this case,

the New Mexico Court cited Rule 17(a) of the New Mexico Rules of
Civil Procedure and stated that this rule:
[R]equires every action to be prosecuted in
the name of the real party in interest. A
real party in interest is 'determined by
whether one is the owner of the right being
enforced and is in a position to discharge
the defendant from liability being asserted
in the suit.!
Id. at 865 (Citing Jesko v. Stauffer Chemical Company, 89 N.M.
786, 790, 558 P.2d 55, 59 (Ct. App. 1976)

(Other citations

omitted in original.))
These principals are directly applicable to the facts of
this case on appeal, and they entitled Lee Martineau to relief
from the Order and Judgment entered on October 11, 198 5.
The original action was an action on an alleged debt, and
the plaintiffs1 claims were based on an oral contract.

There was

no promissory note or other documentation evidencing the debt.
The plaintiffs did produce a mortgage securing debt "in excess of
$200,000.00." (R. 64)

However, having assigned this mortgage,

the plaintiffs were no longer the owner of the right being
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enforced and could not have discharged the defendants from
liability asserted under that document•

In addition, although

there was no dispute that defendant Martineau was a partner of
Magic Valley Properties and signed for the partnership, there was
a dispute over whether Strand was also a partner and whether the
monies he claimed he had loaned to defendants were in fact
investments made by him.

Finally, Martineau asserted offsets and

claims against Strand, both as an individual and as a partner of
Magic Valley Properties.
It was under this scenario and mind set that Martineau
entered the stipulation allowing Strand and MLK to foreclose on
the Idaho property.

Thereafter, pursuant to the terms of the

stipulation, if there was a deficiency, the parties would once
again be before the court; and Martineau would still have his
defenses and claims to offsets and amounts owing him from Strand.
Instead, after Nupetco filed suit in Idaho to foreclose on the
real property located there, Martineau learned that the mortgage
had been assigned.
Defendant Martineau was prejudiced by this assignment and
the fact that he did not know about it, both in his decisions to
defend the action and in his decision to enter the stipulation.
To begin with, there was no promissory note evidencing the debt,
and therefore, Martineau had an absolute defense as against a
third-party assignee.

In addition, Nupetco was not a party to
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the alleged oral agreement for a loan upon which the entire
complaint in this action was based.
Because the assignment prevented Martineau from knowing and
asserting defenses against the real party in interest, the trial
court erred in denying plaintiffs1 motion for relief from the
judgment.

Instead, pursuant to Rule 17(a), the court should have

vacated the order and allowed a reasonable time "for ratification
or commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of,
the real party in interest."

Therefore, the Order and Judgment

of October 11, 1985 should be vacated and the matter remanded for
trial.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AMENDING ITS ORDER
OF OCTOBER 11, 1985, TO ALLOW THE PLAINTIFFS
AND THEIR ASSIGNEE TO PROCEED AGAINST THE
PERSONAL ASSETS OF LELAND MARTINEAU.
There is simply no basis in law or fact which would support
the trial court's granting plaintiffs1 motion to amend the Order
and Judgment of October 11, 1985, to enter a money judgment
against Martineau and to allow plaintiffs to proceed against his
personal assets.
To begin with, the stipulation in court between the parties
on September 3rd was merely to the effect that the mortgage
secured a debt in the amount of $327,989.25 and that plaintiffs
would foreclose on that mortgage prior to seeking a possible
deficiency.

(R. 165 - 169). There is no stipulation that the
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debt is Lee Martineaufs debt and no stipulation that judgment
could be entered against him in the above amount,

(See R. 165;

Order and Judgment, R. 50 - 51; Minute Entry, R. 41; and Joint
Affidavit of Carmen E. Kipp and William W. Barrett R. 349).
Although the record is contradictory as to the exact terms of the
stipulation, even the language used in the order does not grant a
money judgment.

Under the order, the parties agreed:

1) that

the named plaintiffs would proceed in Idaho to foreclose on the
real property and each party reserved the issues of whether a
deficiency judgment would enter and whether that would be against
Lee Martineau;

2) whether Lee Martineau was entitled to offsets

and judgment against the plaintiffs pursuant to the allegations
in his answer and counterclaim; and

3) whether the remaining

$100,000.00 claimed by the plaintiffs was a loan to the
defendants or an investment in Magic Valley Properties.

(R. 50)

As a result, there is no factual basis and no evidence in
the record supporting the court's decision to amend the judgment
to allow plaintiff to proceed against the personal assets of
defendant Lee Martineau to satisfy an amount which was never
entered as a judgment against him.
In addition, there is no legal basis for a personal judgment
to have been entered.

Plaintiff's motion to amend the judgment

(R. 305) was brought on the basis that defendant Lee Martineau
was in contempt of court for having breached his stipulation, and
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therefore the plaintiffs alleged they should be entitled to
proceed against him personally as a punishment therefor.
However, the plaintiffs then turned around and also argued in
support of the motion that the Utah courts did not have
jurisdiction over the Idaho property, and therefore the part of
the order requiring them to foreclose is not binding on the
plaintiffs anyway—even though their failure to foreclose is also
a breach of the stipulation and in contempt of the order of
October 11, 1985.

(R. 310)

While plaintiffs cited authority in their supporting
memorandum that a court can find a breaching party in contempt,
the plaintiffs cited no authority that the remedy they sought was
within the court's power to award for such contempt.

First, the

document at issue is a mortgage, and pursuant to both Idaho law
embodied in Idaho Code § 6-101 and 6-108 and Utah law outlined in
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-37-1 and 2 (1987), a party must first
exhaust its security before seeking a deficiency judgment against
an individual.

There is simply no law to support a contention

that if the plaintiff has difficulty foreclosing, he is entitled
to judgment for the entire amount without doing so.

The law is

well settled to the contrary.
The one action rule quite simply prohibits a mortgagee from
proceeding personally against a mortgagor until the mortgagee
sells the property that is the subject of the mortgage and
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applies the proceeds to the amount secured by the mortgage.
principal is well established and admits of no exception.

This

One of

the earliest cases interpreting Utah law was Hammond v. Wall, 171
P. 148 (Utah 1917) wherein the Supreme Court of Utah cited
Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 16 Utah 165, 104 P. 117 (1909) and stated:
In that case . . . we, in effect, held that
actions to foreclose mortgages under our
statute are essentially actions in rem; that
until the mortgaged property is sold and the
proceeds of sale are applied in discharge of
the mortgage, there is no personal liability
on the part of the mortgagor, and 'that the
personal liability of the mortgagor cannot,
without his consent, be enforced until after
the sale and for the deficiency only.f . . .
In this jurisdiction, therefore, the courts,
in mortgage foreclosure cases, can impose a
personal liability on the mortgagor only
after having ordered a sale of the mortgaged
property and after the sale thereof has been
had according to law, and then he may be held
liable only in case there is a deficiency.
Id. at 150 (emphasis added).
The court went on to point out that the provisions of the
one action rule are mandatory:
[U]nder our statute in mortgage foreclosures,
both the suit and the remedy do not and
cannot operate upon the mortgagor personally,
although he is a defendant in the action
unless and until the remedy against the
mortgaged property is exhausted. Nor can it
be said that the remedy pointed out by our
statute is cumulative merely, and that a
court of equity may, nevertheless, grant any
relief known to such courts.
Id. at 151.
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Several years later, in First National Bank of Coalville v.
Boley, 61 P.2d 621 (Utah 1936), the Supreme Court of Utah
summarized what had become a well established principal of law:
We have held that under these sections there
is no personal liability by the mortgagor
until after a foreclosure sale of the
security, and then only for the deficiency
remaining unpaid, and that a mortgagee may
not have a personal judgment against a
mortgagor until the security has been first
exhausted.
Id. at 623 (citations omitted).
As a result, not only was the relief requested by the
plaintiff not supported by law, it is contrary to law.

At no

time did Lee Martineau agree that judgment be entered against him
prior to foreclosure of the real property, and the court never
received evidence to determine that the debt was owing to
plaintiffs by defendant Martineau.

Finally, the plaintiffs

agreed to rely on a mortgage which later they simply did not
foreclose.
Plaintiff's second argument that the Utah courts had
inpersonum jurisdiction over Lee Martineau but did not have in
rem jurisdiction over the Idaho property was not a basis to grant
the relief requested.

The debt at issue was secured by a

mortgage on real property located in Idaho which the parties
agreed that plaintiffs would first foreclose.

Therefore, the

logical conclusion of plaintiffs1 arguments that the Utah court
did not have jurisdiction, would be that the Utah court must
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dismiss this entire action, and any personal judgment sought by
plaintiff against Martineau could only be entered by the Idaho
court.

Therefore, not only does argument does not support

plaintiffs1 position that they were entitled to personal judgment
against Martineau based upon his alleged contempt, it would
result in this entire case being dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
In addition, there existed factual issues on plaintiff's
basic premise that Lee Martineau was even in contempt of the
October 11, 1985, Order and Judgment.

By the terms of the Order

and Judgment, Martineau waived defenses as to the validity of the
mortgage as against Mike Strand and MLK.

Nupetco was not a party

to this action, was not a party to the stipulation and was not a
party to the Order and Judgment.

Therefore, defendant Martineau

did not waive his defenses as to Nupetco.

He could not have done

so because he had no knowledge of the assignment at the time he
entered the stipulation.
Therefore, the trial court's entry of personal judgment
against Martineau is wholly without legal or factual support.
Lee Martineau never stipulated to judgment against him, and the
court never heard evidence to determine if a debt was owing by
him.

The Order and Judgment itself of October 11, 1985, does

not, by its terms, grant judgment against him.

There exist

factual and legal issues as to whether defenses raised in the
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Idaho foreclosure suit by Magic Valley Properties against Nupetco
are a breach of the stipulation in this action with Michael
Strand and MLK and whether any such breach subjected Lee
Martineau to contempt charges.
Even assuming contempt, there is no statutory or case law
allowing a court to enter personal judgment as a remedy for
contempt against a party to a mortgage for the entire amount of
the debt prior to sale of the security.

Having done so, serious

questions arise as to whether the court has subjected Lee
Martineau to double liability and whether plaintiffs can still
foreclose on the Idaho property while at the same time execute on
the personal assets of Lee Martineau.
As a result, the trial court erred in granting plaintiffs1
motion to amend the judgment to allow the plaintiffs to proceed
against the personal assets of Lee Martineau prior to requiring
the sale of the mortgaged property and a determination of a
deficiency.

That order should be vacated and the matter remanded

for trial on the issues herein.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AGAINST LELAND MARTINEAU DISMISSING
THIS ACTION AND THEREBY PREVENTING HIM FROM
ASSERTING HIS OFFSETS AND COUNTERCLAIMS TO
THE JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST HIM.
Pursuant to order of the court outlined in the Minute Entry
dated December 4, 1987, (R. 391) Martineau submitted his
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affidavit of claimed offsets in support of his motion to stay
execution of any judgment against him pending trial.

(R. 420)

These offsets included items of which the plaintiffs had notice
since before the complaint was filed in 1983.

These consisted of

amounts due for accounting services rendered Strand and his
related entities and amounts claimed for one-half of expenses
paid and services rendered by Martineau on behalf of Magic Valley
Properties based on Martineaufs claim that he and Strand were
partners in Magic Valley Properties.

The third category of

claimed offsets was for the Hammons Judgment which was entered
against Strand in the case of Strand v. Hammons, Civil No.
82-8686.

The judgment is held by the Hammons-Martineau

Partnership of which Martineau is a general partner.
All of these claims and offsets were assigned to the
partnership during the course of this proceeding.

On the morning

of trial, Mr. Petty asserted that, due to this assignment,
Martineau no longer had any right to assert the offsets because a
partner cannot use partnership property for his personal benefit.
Judge Moffat continued the trial, ordered the parties to brief
the issue and ordered defendant not to make any transfers or
disposition of the partnership interests and offsets pending
resolution of the issue.

Oral arguments were heard on April 22,

1988, and Judge Daniels took the matter under advisement.
560)

(R.

On August 23, 1988, the Judge granted plaintiffs1 motion in
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a Minute Entry, stating "The law appears to be that one who
assigns his offsets cannot assert them as a counter-claim.
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted."

The

(R. 561)

This result is contrary to law and equity, and is
inconsistent with previous rulings of the court.
While it is generally true that a partner cannot personally
control partnership assets, under Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-22
(1989), this general rule is made subject to partnership purposes
and/or agreement between the parties.

Section 48-1-22 provides

as follows:
(1) A partner is co-owner with his partners
of specific partnership property holding as a
tenant in partnership.
(2) The incidence of this tenancy are such
that:
(a) A partner, subject to the
provisions of this Chapter and to any
agreement between the partners, has an equal
right with his partners to possess specific
partnership property for partnership
purposes; but he has no right to possess such
property for any other purposes without the
consent of his partners.
(Emphasis added) .
These provisions are directly applicable to this issue on
appeal.

The Hammons-Martineau Partnership was created for the

purposes of, among other things, the operation of defendant Magic
Valley Properties and the collection of Strandfs assets.
I of the partnership agreement states as follows:
NAME, PURPOSE AND DOMICILE. The name of the
Partnership shall be the Hammons-Martineau
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Article

Partnership. The Partnership shall be
conducted for the purposes of conducting
various forms of business enterprises,
including but not limited to the operation of
Magic Valley Properties and the collection of
any assets of Michael W. Strand or related
entities.
(R. 481)
This language in the partnership agreement, as well as the
partnership minutes, establish that at all times both partners to
the Hammons-Martineau Partnership intended that Lee Martineau
would personally claim the offsets at issue in this matter.
Consistently with this authority to do so and pursuant to court
order, (R. 620 - 621) Martineau has used the Hammons judgment as
a supersedeas bond to stay execution of the judgment against him
pending this appeal.
At all times, Mr. Martineau represented to the court that,
with leave of court to do so, he could obtain written
ratification of his personal use of these offsets, assignment of
them back to him in his individual capacity or the joinder or
substitution of the partnership as a defendant.

Instead, the

court dismissed his claims in a brief minute entry to the effect
that "The law appears to be that one who assigns his offsets
cannot assert them as a counterclaim."

Such a conclusion is

contrary to law, and summary judgment against Martineau
dismissing his counterclaims should be vacated and the matter
remanded for trial.
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The decision of the trial court is also wholly inequitable
and improper in light of the history of this case.

Plaintiff's

argument is, in essence, that Martineau was no longer the real
party in interest because of his assignment to an entity.

To

begin with, under Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, an objection that Lee Martineau is no longer the real
party in interest is expressly not grounds for dismissal of his
counterclaims.

Rule 17(a) states, in part that:

No action shall be dismissed on the ground
that it is not prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest until a reasonable
time has been allowed after objection for
ratification of commencement of the action
by, or joinder or substitution of the real
party in interest.
This requirement that a party be allowed a reasonable time
to obtain authority to assert claims or join the proper parties
to an action is further supported by the requirements outlined in
Rule 25(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 25(c)

states as follows:
(c) Transfer of Interest. In the case of
any transfer of interest, the action may be
continued by or against the original party,
unless the court upon motion directs the
person to whom the interest is transferred to
be substituted in the action or joined with
the original party. Service of the motion
shall be made as provided in Subdivision (a)
of this Rule.
Therefore, even assuming that Martineau did not have formal
authority to assert the assigned offsets and claims at the time
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of trial, the dismissal of the counterclaims is contrary to the
express provisions of Rule 17(a) and Rule 25(c).

At the very

least, the court is required to allow a period of time for
joinder or substitution of the proper parties.

As represented to

the court, the partnership was at all times willing to become a
party to the suit or execute the documentation necessary to
ratify Martineau's assertion of the offsets and allow the case to
continue.
The public policy behind these provisions is sound, and it
prevents extended and increased litigation in court case loads as
well as stalemates in pending litigation.

This policy was

addressed by the Utah Supreme Court in Briggs v. Hess, 122 Utah
559, 252 P.2d 538 (1953) wherein the plaintiff was the assignee
of property from the defendant during a quiet title action
pending between the defendant and a third party.

Mr. Briggs had

paid that third party to settle the suit with Hess and then sued
Hess himself.

The Utah Supreme Court stated that:

The answer to any contention that the court
lost jurisdiction in this suit between Tree
and Hess when the latter conveyed during the
pendency of the action, might well be found
in Rule 25(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
designed to continue the litigation with the
same litigants to a determinative conclusion.
Were it otherwise, litigation might arrive at
stalemate by the simple device of a
conveyance pendente lite, resulting in a
series of endless suits.
Id. at 539.
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In this case, the court's decision has rendered Martineau*s
offsets meaningless by its decision, and the effect of that is to
force an independent suit by the Hammons-Martineau Partnership.
Therefore, not only is the decision contrary to the express
provisions of Rules 17 and 25, but it is also unsound from a
policy standpoint.
Further, given that the court allowed the named plaintiffs
Strand and MLK to continue prosecuting this action even though
the mortgage had been assigned to Nupetco, it is wholly
inconsistent and inequitable for the court to dismiss Martineaufs
claims on the identical basis.

The Minute Entry statement that:

"The law appears to be that one who assigns his offsets cannot
assert them as a counterclaim" is completely contrary to the
court's previously having allowed Strand and MLK to assert claims
pursuant to a mortgage assigned to Nupetco prior to commencement
of this suit.
It is also contrary to the court's allowing both John Caine,
on behalf of the plaintiffs Strand and MLK, and Ralph Petty on
behalf of Nupetco, to submit motions, memorandums and other
documents throughout the course of these proceedings.

Mr. Petty

represented an assignee who was not made a party to this suit
until April 26, 1989; (R. 663) and if, as Judge Daniels stated,
everyone knew all along that Nupetco was the plaintiff, (See Pg.
9 of Transcript beginning at R. 696) then it was improper to
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allow the named plaintiffs Strand and MLK to also continue to
assert rights, file motions and respond to defendants motions.
Finally, the decision in August of 1988 to grant the summary
judgment and dismiss the action on the basis that the claims were
partnership property is wholly inconsistent with the court's
granting defendant's motion to stay execution pending trial in
December of 1987.

(R. 444)

At that time Mr. Petty also argued

that Martineau could not use the judgment against Strand as an
offset because it was a partnership asset.

(R. 435)

The court

continues to allow Martineau to use the Hammons Judgment as a
supersedeas bond to stay execution pending appeal.
The dismissal of Martineaufs claims are therefore, contrary
to law and wholly inequitable and improper under the totality of
circumstances in this case.

By granting summary judgment, the

court has denied Martineau his effective defenses to the original
suit and the judgment entered against him, and it has denied him
the right to assert his claims against all the plaintiffs.
Summary judgment dismissing his claim should be reversed and the
issues remanded for trial.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN JOINING NUPETCO AS A PARTY
IN APRIL OF 1989 AND ALLOWING NUPETCO TO ACT
AS A PARTY TO THIS PROCEEDING PRIOR TO THAT
JOINDER.
Although Nupetco was the holder of the mortgage at issue,
this suit was instigated by the assignors, Michael Strand and
MLK.

Nupetco was not made a party until order of the court dated
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April 26, 1989 (R. 663 - 664) , and in fact prior to that time
Nupetco had affirmatively resisted becoming a party.
The April 26th order arose out of a hearing in October of
1988 on unrelated and miscellaneous motions and objections.
During that hearing, the court pointed out to John Caine,
attorney for Strand and MLK, when he represented to the court
that judgment had been granted Nupetco, "The pleadings have never
really been amended."

(See pg. 5 of transcript beginning at R.

696)
In his responsive argument, Mr. Green objected to a
substitution of parties on the basis of the totality of the
circumstances; and the fact that defendant had, over the course
of this proceeding, requested the court and the plaintiffs to
join Nupetco as a party, but Nupetco had always resisted and
refused.

The defendant also objected based upon the inequity of

the court's refusal to allow Martineau to join the
Hammons-Martineau Partnership to this suit and thus preserve his
offsets and claims.

(See Pg. 8 - 10 of the transcript)

Nupetco was not a party either when the summary judgment was
amended to allow plaintiff to proceed against the personal assets
of Martineau; when the parties went to trial on the issues of
offsets; or when judgment was entered dismissing defendant's
counterclaims.

Therefore, it was inequitable and prejudicial

error to join them in April of 1989.
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Although the court states

that it was Mr. Caine's motion to do so, the transcript beginning
at Page 696 of the Record shows that in fact the motion was that
of the court.
Prior to the order substituting parties in April of 1989, it
was also error to allow both John Caine on behalf of Mike Strand
and MLK and Ralph Petty on behalf of Nupetco to prosecute this
action.

Strand and MLK claim now not to have been the real

parties in interest, and Nupetco was not legally a party until
long after the substantive orders had been entered.
Such confusion has prejudiced defendant Martineau, and the
order substituting parties should be vacated.
CONCLUSION
This action began as an action on an oral contract with the
defendant counterclaiming for amounts due him from plaintiffs.
It has ended in the trial court with a personal judgment against
Leland Martineau for a debt secured by real property which has
not been foreclosed, and a dismissal of all Leland Martineau's
offsets to and counterclaims against that judgment.
First, Mr. Martineau entered a stipulation with Strand and
MLK not knowing they had previously assigned the mortgage at
issue to a third party.

The terms of the stipulation set a sum

certain for the debt and required plaintiffs to foreclose the
property located in Idaho.

When he learned that the mortgage had

been assigned, Mr. Martineau brought a motion for relief from
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judgment.

It was error for the court to have denied the motion

because Leland Martineau has been precluded from effectively
defending this action as a result of the assignment and his not
knowing about it.

He is prejudiced because he simply would not

have defended the action and entered the stipulation had he known
of the assignment.
The plaintiffs then returned to court to seek to be allowed
to proceed against Leland Martineau personally for the secured
debt.

The plaintiffs claimed he was in contempt of the

stipulation because Magic Valley Properties had raised defenses
against Nupetco's attempts to foreclose the property.

The court

granted plaintiffs1 motion; and although there has never been a
personal judgment entered against Leland Martineau, plaintiffs1
assignee can now proceed to satisfy the debt of $327,989.25 from
the personal assets of Leland Martineau.

Such a result is wholly

contrary to law, fact and equity.
Finally, the court dismissed all of Leland Martineau's
claims against the plaintiffs and his offsets to the judgment
because prior to trial, Leland Martineau had assigned them to a
partnership of which he was a general partner.

This result flies

in the face of the court's previously allowing Strand and MLK to
continue prosecuting the action despite their assignment of the
mortgage to Nupetco and totally inconsistent with the court's
allowing defendant Leland Martineau to use a judgment also owned
by the partnership as a basis to stay execution pending trial and
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now pending appeal.

Finally, the fact that the court did not

allow Leland Martineau time to ratify his use of the claims or
join or substitute the partnership prior to such dismissal
expressly violates Rules 17 and 25 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Therefore, the trial court erred in failing to set aside the
Order and Judgment of October 11, 1985, in entering personal
judgment against Leland Martineau and in dismissing his
counterclaims and offsets.

All three orders should be vacated

and all issues remanded for trial.
Respectfully submitted this 28th day of December, 1989.

N (USB #1242)
KIM M. ttJHN (USB #5105)

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this 28th day of December, 1989, I
caused to be hand delivered four copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant Leland Martineau to:
Ralph C. Petty
100 Commercial Club Building
32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, four copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant Leland
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Martineau to:
John T. Caine
Richards, Caine & Richards
2568 South Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401

43

ADDENDUM

•a

F-

RICHARDS,
CAINE & RICHARDS
Attorney
for
Plaintiff
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PLC
John T. Caine #0536
RICHARDS, CAINE & RICHARDS
2568 S, Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone (801) 399-4191
and
Ralph C. Petty #2595
32 Exchange Place Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 531-6686
Attorneys for Plaintiff

:\'Ajl 3rd Di3t. Court

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL W. STRAND and MLK
INVESTMENTS, a partnership,
ORDER

Plaintiff,
v.
Civil No. C83-5680

LELAND A. MARTINEAU, CHARLES
WATER, MAGIC VALLEY MOTORS,
I N C . , a n d MAGIC VALLEY
PROPERTIES, a p a r t n e r s h i p .

Judge Scott Daniels
Defendants.

Plaintiff's
dated

October

Plaintiff

Martineau,

Caine

came

on
on

Associates

and

Ralph

C.

to

1985,
on

against

Daniels

Nupetco

11,

foreclose

proceeding

Scott

Motion

to

the

the

Amend

real

Petty,

the

1987,
and

Defendant

and

Judgment,

requirement

assets

before

20,

present

the

property

personal

November

Order

remove

regularly

was

the

in

Idaho

of

the

that

before

Defendant

Honorable

Plaintiff's

Judge

Assignee

represented

by J o h n

T.

Martineau

appeared

in

L~Axif&t r

c

person
Court

and was r e p r e s e n t e d
having

reviewed

reviewed

the files

t h e memoranda

arguments

of

by C o u n s e l

of

counsel,

the
and

John

C.

and r e c o r d s

herein,

parties,

and

for

cause

good

Green,

the

having

received

the

appearing,

therefore:
IT

I S HEREBY ORDERED t h a t

same i s h e r e b y g r a n t e d .
DATED t h i s _ J

Plaintiffs1

Motion be and t h e

jT\~>
d^y of N p v € m b e r , 1 9 8 7 .
By t h e

Court:

ScOtTt n a T i i e l s ,

Judge

ATTEST
H. EXXON WtSDLEY
Approved a s t o Form:

^

L^/fy^^X^-

J o h n C. G r e e n

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to John C. Green at 48 Post Office Place,
#300, Salt Lake City, Utah, this j^^l/C^
19 87.

day of November,

/J:&/?«*

/

John T. Caine #0536
Richards, Caine & Richards
2568 S. Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401
Phone (801) 399-4191

1 !..<{< Judicial District

APR 2 6 1989
/'

S/.LVlAiS£COUN/Y

° y - ' '•*"-*—'

Ralph C. Petty #2595
Attorney for Plaintiff
100 Commercial Club Building
32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone (801) 531-6686

o*poiy Clef.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
NUPETCO ASSOCIATES, a Utah
Limited Partnership,
Plaintiff,

:

AMENDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AGAINST LELAND A. MARTINEAU

:

v.
LELAND A. MARTINEAU, CHARLES
WATER, MAGIC VALLEY MOTORS,
INC., and MAGIC VALLEY
PROPERTIES, a partnership.

:

Civil No. C83-5680

:

Judge Scott Daniels

Defendants.

Plaintiff's motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly
before the Honorable Judge Scott Daniels on April 22, 1988 at the
hour of 10:00 a.m., Plaintiff having been represented by John T.
Caine and Ralph C. Petty, Defendant Leland A. Martineau having
been represented by John C. Green, the Court having reviewed the
memoranda

and

affidavits

submitted

by the parties, having

reviewed the files and records herein, having received the oral
arguments of Counsel, having found that there are no material
issues of fact, that Defendant Leland A. Martineau assigned his

alleged interest in the claims and offsets asserted herein to
another entity, and for good cause appearing therefore:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that because
Defendant
alleged

Leland A. Martineau assigned
claims and offsets asserted

his interest

in the

in this action

to the

Hammons-Martineau Partnership, he is unable to assert said claims
and offsets against the personal judgment entered against him,
and the Court therefore grants summary
Plaintiff Nupetco Associates.

judgment in favor of

All other claims Plaintiff Nupetco

Associates may have against the Defendant Leland A. Martineau and
Defendant Leland A. Martineau may have against Plaintiff Nupetco
Associates or its assignor, Michael Strand, are dismissed without
prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order constitutes a final
order from which appeal may be taken.
DATED this

C2^

day of April, 1989.
By the Court:

Scott Daniels,

Judge

Ap]5ro\Xed a s t o Form:
<

-C^x.

/John C. Green
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I certify that I caused to be hand delivered a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to John C. Green, Gustin, Green,,
Stegall & Liapis, 48 Post Office Place #300,
Utah, this

IV

day of April, 19 89.*

'/ '

Salt Lake City,
,.

7

John T. Caine #0536
Richards, Caine & Richards
2568 S. Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84401
Phone (801) 399-4191

TI..JC Judicial District

APR 2 6 1989

Ralph C. Petty #2595
Attorney for Plaintiff
100 Commercial Club Building
32 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone (801) 531-6686
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL W. STRAND and MLK
INVESTMENTS, a partnership,

:
:

ORDER SUBSTITUTING
PARTIES

Plaintiff,
v•
LELAND A,
MARTINEAU,
CHARLES
WATER,
MAGIC
VALLEY MOTORS,
INC., and MAGIC VALLEY
PROPERTIES, a partnership.

Civil No. C83-5680
:

Judge Scott Daniels

Defendants.

The above-entitled Court, having reviewed

the files and

records herein, having reviewed the Assignment of Plaintiff's
interest in the above-entitled matter to Nupetco Associates,
having reviewed

the Stipulation of the parties before Judge

Moffat at the previously scheduled trial date, having received
the oral representations of the parties at the October 21 hearing
and of its own motion, and for good cause appearing, therefore:

wATllttff

tZ

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJDUGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff
Michael Strand and MLK Investments be substituted by Nupetco
Associates, a Utah limited partnership, as Plaintiff.
DATED this

OA?

day of April, 1989.
By the Court:

Scott Daniels, Judge
Apgrov^d as to Form:

J^hi/C. Green
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that I caused

to be hand delivered a true and

correct .copy of the foregoing to John C. Green, Gustin, Green,
Stegall & Liapis, 48 Post Office Place #300, Salt Lake City,
Utah, this

/( '

day of April, 1989.
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